One key takeaway from the midterm election results is that Americans want the US health care system fixed. They’re tired of rising costs, surprise bills, and a system that only a math genius can successfully navigate. That’s why so many Democrats ran on universal health care access, sometimes referred to as Medicare for All.
Some years ago I wrote a white paper for a Congressional candidate about just what is in this legislation – yes, I read the whole thing – and the political problems with enactment might look like. This analysis covers the Medicare for All Act of 2019, including Bernie Sanders’ Senate (S. 1129) and its sister House version (HR 1384) introduced by Representative Jayapal. Since then, the two have introduced revised versions with some very small changes. The House and Senate versions don’t differ much. Since this was a big issue during the recent campaigns, I want to revisit the issue, and I’ll do that on the live show on Friday. In the meantime, here’s the paper I wrote a while back.
BLUF: This legislation establishes a universal health care program under existing Social Security Act (which established Medicare) definitions and its “global health budget” system for paying providers.It provides robust coverage, including long term care, dental, hearing aids, and vision, with no deductibles, co-pays, or cost share. The law does not ban private health insurance, but pretty much limits their market to services not covered by M4A (a very narrow market) and clients who are not eligible for M4A. The legislation directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to negotiate drug prices and would give the Secretary a lot of power to establish rules for this program.
Services are funded through a Universal Medicare Trust Fund that places all federal heath care program funding in a central account. Medicare, Medicaid, Tricare (retired military health care), and other federal health care programs would consolidate. The funding stream would cover something like a third of the total cost of the program, so additional funding would be needed.
Program Outline
Basically, this legislation would expand Medicare eligibility to “every individual who is a resident of the United States” and give the Secretary of Health and Human Services power to define residency for the purpose of eligibility determination. The program would take effect two years after enactment of the law (four years in the Senate version). During this transition period Americans could keep their current coverage or purchase Medicare coverage as a public option on the Affordable Care Act Exchange.
Under the House version the broad spectrum of benefits under M4A would become available immediately to those buying in. Benefits under the Senate version would mirror what Medicare recipients receive today except that it caps cost-shares and deductibles at fairly low levels.
The House version tasks the Administrator of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services to set buy-in premiums according to family size, age, and tobacco status consistent with the Public Health Service Act. Under the Senate version, the buy-in premium would be the per capita cost of providing all Medicare benefits as estimated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Provisions in both versions set up subsidies for low-income Americans that mirror provisions of the Affordable Care Act.
The Secretary would administer this program through regional offices that would provide needs assessments, recommend changes in provider reimbursements (including regional variations) and create a quality assurance mechanism for their regions.
Both bills include a provision exempting M4A from application of the Hyde Amendment. This means federal funds could be used to pay for abortions under Medicare for All.
Private Insurance and Providers
This law does not ban private health insurance. Carriers may not, however, offer plans that duplicate benefits covered under the Act. Medicare for all offers a comprehensive set of benefits, including preventive care, medications, mental health, oral health, audiology and vision coverage, and long-term care services and support. What a private plan might offer beyond this is not clear. Medicare for All would require no cost-share of any kind, including deductibles, copayments or similar charges. Care and treatment would cost nothing at the point of delivery.
The government does not directly hire providers and does not nationalize any health care operations, infrastructure, or systems. Providers, including individual doctors, hospitals, group practices, and others may provide services under the Program if licensed or certified in their State. Participating providers may contract with individuals to offer services not covered by the Program or to individuals not covered by the Act. Providers may also opt out of the Program entirely and provide any services to anyone they wish.
Budgeting and Provider Payments
Title VI of the Act directs the Secretary to establish a global national health care budgetto pay for operations (providing services), capital expenditures, special projects (mostly focused on rural and other medically underserved areas), and other costs. This budget includes a reserve fund for pandemic or national disaster response.
The Program pays institutional providers quarterly lump sums for services based on annual negotiations between providers and regional directors. These negotiations would consider a variety of factors, including historical volume of services, but excluding capital expenditures or compensation for executives or Board members. Individual practitioners may provide services according to a fee schedule determined by the Secretary. The Secretary will also create a standardized review process similar to the existing “relative value” system currently used for Medicare to ensure accurate valuation of services.
Section 616 of Title VI directs the Secretary to annually negotiate prices for drugs, medical supplies, technologies, and equipment. These negotiations must consider corporate and government investment in development of the drug or item and clinical effectiveness. If negotiations fail, the Secretary may authorize another firm to use data from clinical trials and other patent information to manufacture the item. This is a critical section since it does a lot to keep costs down.
Funding the Program
Title VII of the Act creates the Universal Medicare Trust Fund and transfers appropriations from Medicare, Medicaid, FEHB, Tricare, maternal and child health programs, and other monies to the Trust Fund. In 2022, this amounted to about $1.5 trillion in direct appropriations or other funds, but this would only cover about a third of the cost of single payer. Congress would have to find new revenue streams to pay for this program.
A 10% tax on all income from every source would yield about $1.8 trillion, which almost gets us there, and this tax would hit wealthier people harder since it would apply to capital gains and other investment income as well as regular incomes over the existing cap. If this tax simply shifts premium and out of pocket health care costs from a payment to a private firm to a tax payment, many Americans would be better off financially.
Political Implications
This legislation should concern a variety of interest groups. Passing a version of this bill would not ban private health insurance firms but would virtually eliminate their markets, motivating both corporate executives and front-line workers against the plan. They could contract with individuals or organizations to provide health care insurance plans but could not offer plans that mirror M4A benefits to people eligible for this Program. They could offer plans comparable to M4A only to those who don’t qualify (mostly undocumented immigrants and foreigners). They could presumably cover equipment, services, treatments, and medications M4A does not, a narrow scope of services indeed.
Neither version nationalizes the health care system, and no doctor or other health care provider becomes a government employee. Providers who do not wish to participate as providers in the M4A program could contract with individuals to provide health care (not insurance) and could mirror M4A benefits. Those who do would have to accept payment under fee-for-service or negotiated compensation that would have to look a lot like existing Medicare reimbursement levels. Most providers effectively become government contractors, and many would object to this unless well-compensated. Since calculations of program cost depend on the total US outlay for health care expenses, it would make sense to shift some health insurance corporation profit and executive pay to doctors by raising reimbursement rates.
Pharmaceutical firms will push back hard because it allows government to use its demand-side market power to negotiate drug prices down. It could even ignore patent protection if a firm could not come to terms on price. Since government would under these plans purchase most of the medications traded in the US, this would seriously cut into their profits.
Evangelical groups would also strongly oppose this program because it allows using federal funds to pay for abortions. They Hyde Amendment would not apply to Medicare for All. Veteran and union organizations will act to protect the excellent health care they earned through military service or decades of blue-collar work.
Building popular support for this will depend on convincing people who have good health care plans that giving them up will improve their lives in the long run. Lots of people hate the convoluted way their health insurance provider decides who get what care, when, and how they pay for it. But they know what they have, understand it, and use it for ongoing care they don’t want disrupted. Changing their minds on this won’t be a walk in the park.
Finally, even if supporters of Medicare for All could persuade health care sector corporations, doctors, evangelicals, veterans, and patients of all kinds that this legislation would make their lives better, it’s unlikely to survive Constitutional challenge given the current makeup of the Supreme Court. Today’s Supreme Court simply won’t allow a law prohibiting the sale of particular health care plans to take effect.
This legislation does not socialize medicine in the sense that it takes control of the means of health care production. Doctors don’t become government employees, and hospitals, whether or not for profit, don’t become government agencies. But it does, as a practical matter, nationalize the health insurance sector of the US market. This is, in the long run, good policy. It would make us healthier and cost us less. But passing it will be a big lift.
While we’re working on persuading our fellow Americans that it makes sense, let’s give them a private plan: Medicare buy-in through the ACA exchanges.