The State of War<\/b><\/p>\n
The\u00a0capture of 15 British sailors by Iranian naval forces<\/a>\u00a0on Friday brings to mind an interesting puzzle for international relations theorists: why has war between states become less common, even as fighting among groups within states more so?\u00a0Several possible answers spring to mind, including the increasing cost of war between states as military power becomes more destructive, the growing interdependence between states as globalization proceeds apace, and the desire by intrastate groups to achieve the sovereignty required to be the masters of their own affairs.<\/p>\n Until the invasion of\u00a0Iraq\u00a0by the\u00a0US\u00a0in 2003, it seemed that states had begun to agree on sovereignty principles that would \u201clock in\u201d frontiers and create enormous stigma against changing them.\u00a0States had, before World War II, accepted war in the name of territorial acquisition, dispute resolution, or punitive action.\u00a0By the end of the Cold War they supported military action across state borders to stop genocide (Bosnia), protect humanitarian projects (Somalia), or to stop aggressive states (Iraq\u00a01991), though even this principle was unevenly applied.\u00a0It looks like one effect of the Bush Doctrine has been to reopen the sovereignty norm to conquering states, and by extension force states to become more defensive of their frontiers.\u00a0If this is so, it makes the world a more dangerous place.<\/p>\n The literature on sovereignty is extensive\u2014the rules establishing the nature of the state, how they form, live, and die, and systemic interactions among them call for intensive study of their origin, application, and legitimacy.\u00a0Research into the application of sovereignty has blossomed with the idea that globalization has somehow diluted the power of the state by limiting state action and empowering new actors such as international organizations, advocacy groups, and corporations.\u00a0In the last few years, scholars have published several books on the changing nature of sovereignty and the impact of these changes on the use of violence among international actors.<\/p>\n In his book\u00a0Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy<\/a><\/i>, for example,\u00a0Stephen Krasner<\/a>\u00a0argued against the claim that globalization has eroded state sovereignty by pointing out that it was never very evenly applied in the first place.\u00a0States, he argues, cite the benefits or obligations of sovereignty only when it serves their interests, and in the end the powerful states\u2014because they can more easily impose their will\u2014successfully define it in ways that suit their preferences.\u00a0As a set of rules or norms it varies with state interests.<\/p>\n Martha Finnemore<\/a>, on the other hand, makes a case in\u00a0The Purpose of Intervention<\/a><\/i>\u00a0that the norm itself has changed and rendered illegitimate certain state actions.\u00a0As evidence, she points out that states no longer mount punitive expeditions against rivals that renege on agreements, fail to pay debts, or mistreat their citizens.\u00a0States, to be sure, still intervene but today are much less likely to use military force across national frontiers and more likely to intervene on behalf of oppressed populations than international corporations.\u00a0States are more likely to work within international legal frameworks, and when they use military force they are more likely to do so collectively than unilaterally.<\/p>\n Martin Van Creveld<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Mary Kaldor<\/a>\u00a0explain how this changes the nature of international conflict.\u00a0Van Creveld points out in\u00a0The Transformation of War<\/a><\/i>\u00a0that most international conflict since 1945 has been between states and insurgent groups or terrorists.\u00a0This is so because, as Finnemore suggests, the reason for fighting has changed\u2014organized violence is no longer a useful tool for states in settling disputes among them so they prefer to seek compromise in other venues (this idea is supported by\u00a0James Fearon\u2019s<\/a>\u00a0argument that\u00a0only in extreme cases is there no compromise preferable to the cost and destructiveness of modern war).\u00a0Sovereigns are less likely to use war on each other, but non-sovereigns who hope to influence states or each other have no such normative limit (or are forced by circumstance to violate it).<\/p>\n Kaldor likewise\u00a0describes the shift from organized violence in the name of interstate relations to conflict among groups within states or between states and groups within them<\/a>.\u00a0She then makes a policy prescription, suggesting that states should reconfigure their capacity for violence to meet non-state threats.\u00a0Because state military forces are organized for conflict with other states they are more likely to meet threats like terrorism by attacking other states, where international legal frameworks and institutions may be not only more effective but less dangerous and destructive.<\/p>\n After the\u00a0World\u00a0Trade\u00a0Center\u00a0attacks in 2001, for example, the\u00a0US\u00a0framework for meeting the threat posed by al-Qa\u2019ida depended on military action against a state.\u00a0Attacking\u00a0Afghanistan\u00a0was arguably necessary for more than domestic political reasons since the Taliban rejected demands to extradite al-Qa\u2019ida members.\u00a0But further efforts to manage asymmetric terrorist threats focused on the use of military power against states instead of the development of a consensus against terrorism as a political tool and institutional and legal infrastructure for stigmatizing and managing it.<\/p>\n Bush Administration rhetoric suggests that US leaders have not moved beyond the idea that national defense depends on identification of enemy\u00a0states <\/i>and appropriate use of military power against them.\u00a0Instead of focusing their attention on non-sovereign groups over which states may have little control or influence, the US seems determined to exacerbate tensions with states that in fact\u00a0share<\/a>\u00a0our\u00a0interest<\/a>\u00a0in\u00a0limiting the ability of organizations like al-Qa\u2019ida to influence world affairs by using violence<\/a>\u00a0(this article suggests that naming Iran as part of an \u201caxis of evil\u201d stood in the way of possible cooperation against criminal elements that threatened both states).<\/p>\n It is difficult to separate international diplomatic rhetoric and the desire to please domestic audiences.\u00a0As a Muslim nation,\u00a0Iran\u00a0must tread carefully when working with the\u00a0US\u00a0to stop Muslim political activity\u2014even if violent\u2014that its population supports.\u00a0Likewise, American politicians want to show that they are working diligently to protect US citizens.\u00a0Even if the visible counterterror efforts are less effective than hidden activity the political incentive is to take obvious steps to attack\u00a0someone.<\/i>\u00a0There is likely more than neoconservative\/neorealist ideology at work here.<\/p>\n Whatever the source of US policies, any strategy that leads to conflict between states and ignores the real threats from insurgent and criminal organizations makes international society more dangerous in at least two ways.\u00a0First, it makes war between states\u2014the most dangerous and destructive type of conflict\u2014more likely.\u00a0States are still the best organizers and managers of violence in the world today, and even relatively weak ones can deploy violence on a scale against which the destruction of two skyscrapers and the deaths of 3000 Americans pales.<\/p>\n Second, and potentially more problematic, it not only focuses resources and attention away from the real threat it also makes the kind of cooperation necessary for dealing with asymmetric violence much more difficult to achieve.\u00a0If our diplomatic rhetoric and military spending concentrates on meeting threats from other states, we both misallocate resources and alienate the global political and business leaders who can help us to address the real threat: outlaw groups that are difficult to identify and target with conventional military power.<\/p>\n It is the job of leaders to lead, and that means\u00a0US\u00a0politicians need to make the case to Americans that, as Van Creveld and Kaldor point out, military power may not be our most effective tool for dealing with international terrorism.\u00a0Instead of making enemies of other states like Iran that have the capacity to construct and deploy nuclear weapons \u2013 not to mention conventional munitions that collectively are perhaps more destructive if not as cataclysmic \u2013 we should be leading the world toward development of legal and institutional frameworks that treat terrorists like the criminals they are.\u00a0Bush Administration rhetoric that prepares the way for conflict with\u00a0Iran, and incidents on the high seas that ratchet up this rhetoric by framing the conflict as one between states, do not make us safer.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The State of War The\u00a0capture of 15 British sailors by Iranian naval forces\u00a0on Friday brings to mind an interesting puzzle for international relations theorists: why has war between states become less common, even as fighting among groups within states more so?\u00a0Several possible answers spring to mind, including the increasing cost of war between states as 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